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Post-1997 Hong Kong: Will Sufficient 
Educational Autonomy Remain to 
Safeguard Academic Freedom? 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong, currently a British colony, is slated to 
become a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Repub-
lic of China (PRC) .1 When this news first reached the people of Hong 
Kong, over ninety-five percent of the people disclosed in a survey that 
they preferred not to be under the government of the PRC.2 Given the 
fact that a majority of Hong Kong residents have experienced some 
form of oppression by the Communist government of the PRC, this 
widespread disdain is not surprising.3 
Cognizant of their unpopularity, the PRC has instituted a campaign 
to assure Hong Kong residents that their personal freedoms will not 
be curtailed.4 The government has propagated the slogan of "One 
Country, Two Systems," which promises that the people of Hong Kong 
will rule Hong Kong with a high level of autonomy.5 As further assur-
ance, the PRC has also drawn up for the future Hong Kong SAR a 
constitution, known as the Basic Law, for the future Hong Kong SAR.6 
Nonetheless, as the arrival ofPRC rule approaches, much discussion 
about the future of personal freedoms and civil rights has arisen. 7 One 
1 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, 
initialed Sept. 26, 1984, Gr. Brit.-P.R.C., paras. 2, 3(1), 23 I.L.M. 1371, 1371 [hereinafter Joint 
Declaration]. 
2 NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KoNG 239 (1991). 
3 !d. A majority of Hong Kong residents are aware of the oppressive acts of the Communists 
either through firsthand experience or through family stories. See id. Many Hong Kong residents 
either fled from the PRC's Communist Party in 1949, experienced persecution from the Red 
Guards during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, or some have experienced other campaigns 
against the bourgeoisie. !d.; see also Edward A. Gargan, Britain Says It Will Monitor China's Rule 
of Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1996, at A3. 
4 !d. 
5 !d. 
6 !d. at 10. 
7 See generally CIVIL LIBERTIES IN HoNG KoNG (Raymond Wacks ed., 1988); Tm: FUTURE OF 
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essential personal freedom is the right to education.8 The PRC's state-
monopolized education system explicitly indoctrinates political views 
so as to produce supporters of its socialist ideals.9 Given this backdrop, 
whether the PRC will allow Hong Kong to operate its education system 
free of the PRC's political agenda remains to be seen. 
At first glance, guarantees for educational autonomy under the Basic 
Law appear to safeguard the right to education. 10 The Basic Law clearly 
provides that the future Hong Kong SAR will be able to continue to 
enjoy a high level of autonomy.U This autonomy encompasses the 
control of the education system. 12 In fact, the Basic Law explicitly 
provides that schools may continue to provide religious education and 
students may continue to choose educational institutions freely. 13 The 
history of the PRC's treatment of civil rights, the tension arising out of 
Taiwan's alleged move for independence, and the PRC's averse reac-
tion to democratic reforms in Hong Kong raise serious doubts, how-
ever, as to the sincerity of these promises. 
This Note sets out to evaluate whether sufficient educational auton-
omy will exist to safeguard the right to education. Section I provides 
the reader with the legal context out of which the question of educa-
THE LAW IN HoNG KONG (Raymond Wacks ed., 1989); HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONG KONG (Raymond 
Wacks ed., 1992). 
8 Throughout this Note, the right to education and academic freedom is defined as one's right 
to pursue an education that is free of a political agenda and free of government censorship. 
Where there is such an academic freedom, the government is to respect the wishes of parents 
and students to obtain teaching that is in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions. SeeBELG. CaNST. (Coordinated Constitution of Belgium, Feb. 17, 1994) art. 24, § 1, 
reprinted in 2 CoNSTITUTIONS OF THE CouNTRIES OF THE WoRLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gilbert 
H. Flanz eds., 1994) [hereinafter BELG. CaNsT.); see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 
589, 603 (1967). The Keyishian Court provides the following: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of tran-
scendent value to all of us ... [and] is therefore a special concern of the First Amend-
ment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom .... 
The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust 
exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather) than 
through any kind of authoritative selection." 
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. 
9 EDUCATION AND SOCIETY IN HONG KONG: TOWARD ONE COUNTRY AND Two SYSTEMS app. E 
(Gerard A. Postiglione ed., 1992) [hereinafter EDUCATION & SociETY). 
10 Basic Law ofthe Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, 
arts. 136-37, 29 I.L.M. 1520, 1541 (1990) [hereinafter Basic Law]. 
11 !d. art. 12. 
12 !d. art. 136. 
13 !d. art. 137. 
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tiona} autonomy arises. This section provides the reader with a history 
of Hong Kong and a discussion of the Joint Declaration and the Basic 
Law. Section II outlines Hong Kong's education system, including its 
organizational structure, current changes in the system, and the sys-
tem's significance to the PRC. Section III of this Note, titled the 
"Modern Context," offers the reader circumstances and events contem-
poraneous to and relevant to the situation in Hong Kong. This section 
covers the PRC's historical and present treatment of civil liberties, the 
PRC's reaction to Governor Patten's democratic reforms in 1992, its 
treatment of Taiwan's 1996 presidential elections, and current business 
and social attitudes of the people of Hong Kong. Section IV analyzes 
whether sufficient autonomy exists to safeguard academic freedom by 
evaluating several factors. The language of the provisions found in the 
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, set against the PRC's treatment 
of civil rights, autonomy, and democracy, rings hollow for assuring 
educational autonomy and academic freedom. The highly centralized 
nature of the education system and its strong dependence on eco-
nomic prosperity bode unfavorably for educational autonomy as well. 
Although interdependence between Hong Kong and PRC academi-
cians is promising for education, this evidence is offered with caution. 
This Note concludes that the PRC's track record of safeguarding civil 
rights and its hostility towards events in Hong Kong and Taiwan un-
dermine its promises to Hong Kong of educational autonomy and 
academic freedom. 
I. LEGAL CONTEXT 
A. Hong Kong's Path to the Present 
Modern day Hong Kong,14 once China's "barren island with hardly 
a house upon it,"15 came into British possession in various phases. From 
1839 to 1842, the Chinese16 and the British were engulfed in what was 
14 In this Note, unless otherwise stated, the term "Hong Kong" refers to the entire region 
comprising Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and the New Territories. See Joint Declaration, supra 
note 1, para. 1, at 1371. The PRC will regain sovereignty over this entire region on july 1, 1997. 
/d. 
15 JoNATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MoDERN CHINA 156 (1990) (quoting the British Lord 
Palmers ton who was furious with Charles Elliot for not exacting "better" terms from the Chinese). 
16 For the purpose of this Note, the terms "Chinese" or "China," unless otherwise stated, will 
refer to the people, culture, or region of the modern PRC. In differentiating the geographic 
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to become the First Opium WarY The Second Opium War occurred 
from 1858-1860.18 Then, in 1894-1895, when China suffered defeat 
from the Japanese, the British took advantage of the situation and 
sought additional concessions of Chinese territory.19 
During the early 1800s, the ever-expanding opium trade had both 
deleterious economic and social effects on China.20 Its momentum had 
risen to a level where the amount of Chinese silver diverted for this 
trade was harming the national economy. 21 Moreover, smoking opium 
had become so widespread that over one million people were ad-
dicted.22 
China's unsuccessful attempts to curb the trade only aggravated its 
relations with the British.23 Unsuccessful negotiations brought about 
fighting and blockades, which resulted in the First Opium War.24 In 
1842, both parties ended the war with the signing of the Nanking 
Treaty.25 
Of particular relevance to this Note is Article III of the Nanking 
Treaty, which concerns the island of Hong Kong.26 This article provides 
that China is to cede the island of Hong Kong to the British "in 
region of the PRC from Hong Kong and Taiwan, this Note will refer to it as "the mainland" or 
"mainland China." 
17 SPENCE, supra note 15, at 152-58. 
IS MINERS, supra note 2, at 3. 
19 /d. 
2° SPENCE, supra note 15, at 129, 149. 
21 /d. at 149. 
22 /d. at 129. Users of opium included people from all walks of life-eunuchs in the imperial 
courts, wealthy women confined to the walls of their households, soldiers on their way to combat, 
coolie laborers, and peasants in the countryside. /d. at 131. 
23 /d. at 152-58. 
24 SPENCE, supra note 15, at 152-58. In response to China's trade blockades and opium seizures, 
the British launched a campaign against China. /d. at 154-56. Under the direction of George 
Elliot, a full British fleet arrived in Canton in 1840. /d. at 156. This fleet blockaded coastal harbors 
and seized the main town on the island of Zhoushan. /d. Subsequently, Sir Henry Pottinger led 
forces that launched a more forceful attack on the Chinese. /d. at 157. His forces attacked and 
captured cities such as Ningbo, Xiamen, and Zhoushan. SPENCE, supra note 15, at 157. As he 
captured Shanghai and Zhenjiang, he approached the former Ming dynasty capital of Nanjing. 
/d. At this time, the Qing officials had already been pleading for peace and, thus, a treaty was 
signed in 1842. /d. 
25 /d. 
26 Treaty at Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842, China-Gr. Brit., art. III, 93 Consol. T.S. 465, 467 [hereinafter 
Nanking Treaty]. 
It being obviously necessary and desirable that British subjects should have some port 
whereat they may careen and refit their ships when required, and keep stores for that 
purpose, His Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Her Majesty the Queen of Great 
Britain, &c., the Island of Hong Kong, to be possessed in perpetuity by Her Britannic 
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perpetuity. "27 The Treaty of Nanking laid the foundation for Chinese 
concession of territory to the British. 
Further concessions of Chinese territory to the British followed. In 
1860, after the British victory during the Second Opium War, the 
British forced the Chinese government to cede the peninsula of 
Kowloon.28 Subsequently, in 1895, following China's loss to Japan, the 
British took advantage of the situation and demanded a ninety-nine 
year leasehold for the New Territories, the region attached to the 
Kowloon Peninsula on the southeastern tip of mainland China. 29 On 
June 9, 1898, both the British and the Chinese formalized the lease in 
the Convention of Peking, which became effective on July 1, 1898.30 
Thus, in three phases, the British gained control of the Island of Hong 
Kong, the Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories, which make 
up modern day Hong Kong. 
Since the establishment of the current PRC government in 1911, the 
PRC has left Hong Kong relatively undisturbed.31 No official reasoning 
exists for this policy.32 The unofficial assumption, however, is that the 
economic benefits of Hong Kong's autonomy have persuaded the PRC 
to permit Hong Kong to maintain its independent course.33 One com-
mentator suggests that during the 1950s an informal agreement must 
have occurred between the governments of the PRC and the United 
Kingdom.34 Conditions of this possible informal agreement were likely 
Majesty. her heirs and successors, and to be governed by such laws and regulations as 
Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, &c., shall see fit to direct. 
!d. In referring to the treaty, scholars have used both "Nanking" and "Nanjipg." See id.; SPENCE, 
supra note 15, at 157. "Nanking" and "Nanjing" are the names of the same city. The difference 
is in the romanization of the Chinese name. "Nanking" is most likely based on the Cantonese 
dialect of Southern China and the dialect used in Hong Kong. 
27 Nanking Treaty, supra note 26, art. III, at 467. 
28 MINERS, supra note 2, at 3. 
29 Jd. The British had originally wanted a full concession of the New Territories from the 
Chinese, but because other nations, such as Russia, France, and Germany, were seeking like 
concessions and settled for similar leaseholds, the British decided to take the same. Id. This last 
lease was confirmed at the Convention of Peking in 1898. The Convention of Peking, June 9, 
1898, China-Gr. Brit., reprinted in MINERS, supra note 2, app. A at 246-47 [hereinafter Convention 
of Peking]. The relevant portions of the Convention state, "[t]he term of this lease [respecting 
the extension of Hong Kong Territory] shall be for ninety-nine years ... [and] shall come into 
force on the lst day of July, 1898, being the 13th day of the 5th moon of the 24th year of Kuang 
Hsii." ld. at 247. 
3° Convention of Peking, supra note 29, at 246-47. 
31 MINERS, supra note 2, at 5. 
32 See id. at 6. 
33 /d. at 5 
34 !d. at 6. 
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that the PRC would not disturb British rule so long as the British did 
not interfere with the Chinese interests in Hong Kong. 35 
The existence of the Convention of Peking necessitated formal ac-
tion on the part of the governments of the PRC and the UK as the 
ninety-nine year lease was coming to an end.36 Additionally, the British 
government feared that an uncertain future would deter investors from 
Hong Kong.37 Despite the PRC's attempts to postpone the inevitable, 
it had to make a decision regarding Hong Kong. 38 
In 1982, the first formal outline of Hong Kong's future appeared.39 
In an audience with Deng Xiaoping, former British Prime Minister 
Edward Heath discussed Hong Kong's future with Deng.40 At first, 
Deng proposed to treat Hong Kong as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) 
in which inhabitants of Hong Kong would rule and the present capi-
talist system would remain. 41 Subsequently, the PRC adopted its 1982 
Constitution which provided for a Special Administrative Region 
(SAR) with a high level of autonomy.42 The government adopted this 
provision with Hong Kong's future in mind.43 
Mter two years of negotiations, heads of both governments came to 
an agreement and initialed the Joint Declaration of the Government 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of 
Hong Kong Qoint Declaration) in September 1984, and ratification 
35 !d. Particularly, conditions may have included that the British not institute democratic 
processes in Hong Kong, that Taiwan not be allowed to set up any official post in Hong Kong, 
and that China be allowed to continue to benefit from the Hong Kong economy. MINERS, supra 
note 2, at 6. .. 
36 !d. at 7. Technically, the Convention of Peking only applies to the New Territories. See supra 
note 29 and accompanying text. Both the island of Hong Kong and the peninsula of Kowloon 
may continue under British sovereignty. Nanking Treaty, supra note 26, art. III, at 467; see also 
MINERS, supra note 2, at 3. Nonetheless, the British have decided to return Hong Kong in its 
entirety to the PRC at the end of the 99 years. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, paras. 1-2, at 1371. 
37 MINERS, supra note 2, at 7. Land investors in the New Territories of Hong Kong had contracts 
that were set to expire on june 27, 1997. !d. This did not deter investors at first, but the imminence 
of 1997 stirred some anxieties. !d. 
38 See id. at 6-8. 
39 !d. at 8. 
40 MINERS, supra note 2, at 8. 
41 Id. Currently, the PRC has established certain areas as SEZs in order to encourage free 
markets and some level of economic autonomy. !d. One of these SEZ is Shenzhen, sandwiched 
between Hong Kong and Guangdong province, which has experienced phenomenal economic 
success. SPENCE, supra note 15, at 673-74, 703. 
42 XIANFA [Constitution] (1982) art. 31, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF 
THE WoRLD (Albert P. Blaustein and Gilbert H. Flanz eds., 1995); MINERS, supra note 2, at 8. 
43 MINERS, supra note 2, at 8; see also Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(1), at 1371. 
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followed in June, 1985.44 Subsequently, on April 4, 1990, the PRC 
adopted the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR (Basic Law) which 
elaborates the general principles of the Joint Declaration and serves 
as the constitution of the Hong Kong SAR.45 Both the Joint Declaration 
and the Basic Law serve as the foundational legal documents of the 
future Hong Kong SAR.46 
B. The joint Declaration 
As the official document that resolves the question of Hong Kong's 
future, the Joint Declaration outlines the administration of the Hong 
Kong government after July 1, 1997.47 In this document, the British 
have stated their agreement to return Hong Kong to the PRC on July 
1, 1997.48 Once the British leave, the PRC will resume sovereignty over 
Hong Kong and govern it as a SAR.49 The Joint Declaration specifically 
provides that the Hong Kong SAR, although under PRC sovereignty, 
will still enjoy a "high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and 
defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's 
Government [of the PRC]. "50 
The Basic Law offers autonomy to the people of Hong Kong through 
independent powers and maintenance of the status quo. 51 Hong Kong 
will have its own executive, legislative, and independent judicial pow-
44 MINERS, supra note 2, at 9-IO. 
45 Basic Law, supra note IO; MINERS, supra note 2, at IO. 
46Joint Declaration, supra note I, para. 3(I2), at I372; MINERS, supra note 2, at IO. 
47 Joint Declaration, supra note I, para. 3, at I37I-72. 
48 /d. para. 2, at I37l. 
49 ld. paras. I, 3(I), at I37l. Paragraph 3 of the Joint Declaration sets out in twelve subparts 
the crux of Hong Kong's future: (I) Hong Kong will be a Special Administrative Region; (2) the 
Hong Kong SAR will be under the governance of the Central People's Government of the PRC, 
with a high level of autonomy, except for foreign and defensive affairs; (3) current laws in Hong 
Kong will remain and Hong Kong will be vested with its own executive, legislative, and adjudica-
tory functions; ( 4) elections by local inhabitants of Hong Kong or consultations will choose the 
office of the chief executive; (5) social and economic systems, as well as personal freedoms, will 
remain unchanged; (6) Hong Kong will remain a free port and a separate customs territory; (7) 
Hong Kong will remain an international trade center with its own currency; (8) Hong Kong will 
have independent finances with no taxes levied by the PRC; (9) Hong Kong may enter into 
mutually beneficial commercial relationships; (IO) under the name of "Hong Kong, China," it 
may develop and maintain cultural and economic relations and issue travel documents; (II) 
maintenance of order will be the responsibility of the government of the Hong Kong SAR; and 
(I2) implementation of the above will be stipulated in the Basic Law and will remain unchanged 
for fifty years. /d. para. 3, at I371-72. 
50 /d. para. 3(2), at I37I. 
51 Joint Declaration, supra note I, paras. 3(3), 3(5), at I371-72. 
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ers.52 Although Hong Kong's Chief Executive will be appointed by the 
PRC, this appointment will be based upon elections by the people of 
Hong Kong.53 Furthermore, the Basic Law has provided that the office 
of the Chief Executive will be filled by someone chosen from among 
the Hong Kong people, as opposed to someone from the PRC. 54 The 
Joint Declaration purports to allow all current social and economic 
institutions, including the current educational system, to remain un-
touched by the PRC for the next fifty years. 55 This fifty year protection 
extends to the implementation of a Basic Law to be drawn up for the 
Hong Kong SAR of the PRC. 56 
C. The Basic Law 
The Basic Law sets forth in detail the proposals found in the Joint 
Declaration.57 The Basic Law consists of nine chapters and three an-
nexes.58 Within these chapters, the Basic Law discusses the general 
principles of the SAR, describes the relationship between Hong Kong 
and the PRC, and lays out the SAR's political and economic structure. 59 
It also enumerates the fundamental rights and duties of the Hong 
Kong people and provides that they will eventually enjoy universal 
52 Id. para. 3(3), at 1371. 
53 !d. para. 3( 4), at 1372. The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
is the head of the Hong Kong SAR and is accountable to the CPG. Basic Law, supra note 10, art. 
43. Some of the responsibilities of the Chief Executive include implementation of the Basic Law, 
signing and promulgating laws passed by the Legislative Council, nomination for appointment 
and suggestions for removal of chief officials, appointment and removal of judges and public 
officials, and approval of motions on budgetary finances. ld. art. 48. The process for choosing a 
Chief Executive, which is a five-year post, for the SARis set forth under Annex I of the Basic Law. 
ld. annex I. Eventually, this post is to be the result of universal suffrage. ld. art. 45. 
54 See Basic Law, supra note 10, arts. 3, 44;Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(4), at 1372. 
55 Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(5), annex I, § 1, at 1372-73. 
The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and 
so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of 
the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of 
strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be 
ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private property, 
ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be 
protected by law. 
ld. para. 3(5), at 1372. 
56Jd. para. 3(12), at 1372. 
57 Id. 
58 See generally Basic Law, supra note 10. 
59 ld. chs. I, II, IV, V. 
1997] HoNG KoNG AFTER 1997 195 
suffrage.60 Guidelines for the interpretation and amendment of the 
Basic Law are also included.61 
Chapter VI specifically addresses the area of education. 52 Under the 
Basic Law, the current education system will remain untouched.63 
Hong Kong's own department of education will retain autonomy in 
formulating its own policies.64 This autonomy extends to educational 
institutions as well. 65 In fact, schools that are currently run by religious 
organizations may continue to provide religious education.66 
Religious schools find further comfort in the same chapter of the 
Basic Law, which proposes no changes to religious organizations.fi7 Not 
only will they remain intact, but religious organizations may also be able 
to maintain their ties to foreign counterparts under the Basic Law.68 
60 !d. ch. III, arts. 45, 68. 
61 !d. ch. VIII. 
62 !d. arts. 136-37, 148-49. 
63 Basic Law, supra note 10, arts. 136-37. 
On the basis of the previous educational system, the Government of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate policies on the development 
and improvement of education, including policies regarding the educational system and 
its administration, the language of instruction, the allocation of funds, the examination 
system, the system of academic awards and the recognition of educational qualifications. 
Community organizations and individuals may, in accordance with law, run educa-
tional undertakings of various kinds in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
Educational institutions of all kinds may retain their autonomy and enjoy academic 
freedom. They may continue to recruit staff and use teaching materials from outside 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Schools run by religious organizations 
may continue to provide religious education, including courses in religion. 
Students shall enjoy freedom of choice of educational institutions and freedom to 
pursue their education outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
!d. arts. 136-37. 
64 !d. art. 136. 
65 !d. art. 137. 
66 !d. 
67 Basic Law, supra note 10, art. 141. 
!d. 
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall not restrict 
the freedom of religious belief, interfere in the internal affairs of religious organizations 
or restrict religious activities which do not contravene the laws of the region .... 
Religious organizations may, according to their previous practice, continue to run 
seminaries and other schools, hospitals and welfare institutions and to provide other 
social services. 
Religious organizations and believers in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
may maintain and develop their relations with religious organizations and believers 
elsewhere. 
68 !d. arts. 141, 149. 
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Article 141 of the Basic Law specifically affirms the exercise of free 
religion in the Hong Kong SAR.69 Furthermore, Articles 32 through 34 
state that Hong Kong residents have freedoms of conscience, of occu-
pation, and of engaging in academic and cultural pursuits. 70 
II. EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT 
A. Organization of the Hong Kong Education System 
Given the premise that the current education system will remain 
intact, a look at the present system is helpful in determining the nature 
of the educational system. A student in Hong Kong starts her formal 
education at the age of six with six years of primary school. 71 Sub-
sequently, she proceeds to three more years of schooling through a 
junior secondary program. 72 These first nine years make up the com-
pulsory educational requirements in Hong Kong, which have been in 
place since 1978.73 Mter these required nine years, a student may 
continue her education with a two-year senior secondary course.74 
Successful completion of this course allows a student to continue on 
to a one- or two-year sixth form course, the duration of which is 
dependent upon a student's tertiary education plans.75 
The overall governing structure of Hong Kong's education system is 
a centralized system, with decentralized components at the lower lev-
Non-governmental organizations in fields such as ... religious organizations in the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may maintain and develop relations with 
their counterparts in foreign countries and regions and with relevant international 
organizations. They may, as required, use the name 'Hong Kong, China' in the relevant 
activities. 
!d. art. 149. This language departs from that of the PRC's own constitution which states that 
"religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination." XIANFA art. 36. 
In practice, the PRC language has meant that religious organizations must discontinue relations 
with their foreign counterparts. See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text. 
69 Basic Law, supra note 10, art. 141. 
70 !d. arts. 32-34. 
71 Paul Morris, Preparing Pupils as Citizens of the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong: 
An Analysis of Curriculum Change and Control During the Transition Period, in EDuCATION & 
SociETY, supra note 9, at 117, 119. 
72 !d. 
73 Gerard A. Postiglione, The Decolonization of Hong Kong Education, in EDUCATION & SociETY, 
supra note 9, at 3, 11. 
74 Morris, supra note 71, at 119. 
75 !d. at 119-20. Tertiary education takes place at the few universities and polytechnic institutes 
in Hong Kong. !d. 
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els.76 All of the decision-making power is concentrated at the head of 
the system in the governor-in-council, who is appointed by the Queen.77 
In practice, however, members of the Executive Council (ExCo) are 
the actual decision-makers. 78 The next level in the structure consists of 
four subcommittees, which advise the ExCo.79 These four subcommit-
tees make up the decentralized components of the system.80 The Board 
of Education oversees kindergarten through the sixth form. 81 The 
Universities and Polytechnics Grants Committee funds and develops 
education at the university level and preserves institutional autonomy.82 
The Vocational Training Council supervises all technical education.83 
The Education Commission consists of members from the general 
community and members from each of the other three advisory com-
mittees.84 This committee oversees the overall educational policies and 
the interactions among the various sectors.85 With such committees in 
place, despite the centralized decision-making power at the top level, 
people are more willing to accept the decisions made.86 The consult-
ative functions of these committees legitimize the centralized decisions 
of the governor-in-council.87 
Control over the area of school curricula stems from Hong Kong's 
Education Regulations.88 The Education Regulations limit instructions 
to those that comply with a syllabus approved by the Director.89 The 
Director must also approve any document used in any class in any 
schooJ.9° Moreover, pursuant to these regulations, the content of cur-
ricula must exclude political education in Hong Kong schools.91 
76 See Postiglione, supra note 73, at 13. 
77 Cheng Kai Ming, Educational Policymaking in Hong Kong: The Changing Legitimacy, in 
EDUCATION & SoCIETY, supra note 9, at 97, 107. 
78 /d. 
79 See Postiglione, supra note 73, at 13; see also Cheng Kai Ming, The Policymaking and Admin-
istrative Bodies of Education, in EDUCATION & SociETY, supra note 9, app. B. 
so See Postiglione, supra note 73, at 13. 
81 /d. 
82 Cheng, supra note 77, at 108; Postiglione, supra note 73, at 13. 
83 Postiglione, supra note 73, at 13. 
84 Cheng, supra note 77, at 109; Postiglione, supra note 73, at 13. 
85 Cheng, supra note 77, at 109. 
86 See Postiglione, supra note 73, at 13. 
87 /d. 
88 Morris, supra note 71, at 121. 
89 /d. (citing Education Dept., Education Regulations, cap. 279, § 84, 92(1) (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1971) [hereinafter Education Regs.]). 
90 Education Regs., supra note 89, cap. 279, § 84, 92(6). 
91 Morris, supra note 71, at 121; see also Education Regs., supra note 89, cap. 279, § 84, 92(6). 
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In practice, two central organizations, the Curriculum Development 
Committees (CDC) and the Hong Kong Examination Authority 
(HKEA), control the overall curriculum in Hong Kong.92 The CDC is 
responsible for the design of curricula and the approval of school 
textbooks.93 Execution of such duties is in the form of formal curricu-
lum mandates that specify the range of subjects to be studied and the 
list of textbooks to be used.94 The HKEA is an independent statutory 
body.95 As the organization administering all of Hong Kong's public 
examinations, the HKEA exercises much de facto authority over what 
is taught in the classrooms.96 The HKEA dictates specifically what 
materials the exams cover and in what manner the examinations will 
test students.97 Since success on these examinations translates into high 
economic benefits, teachers and students have strong incentives to 
comply with HKEA's syllabi.98 
B. Changes in Curriculum Content 
Recent political changes in Hong Kong have caused educational 
institutions to rethink their stance on education and politics.99 In 
response to the imminent return to Chinese sovereignty, both legisla-
tive councilors and public pressure groups have voiced their desire to 
introduce a political education. 100 The driving force behind a political 
education is the aim to ensure a more politically literate and active 
citizenry. 101 The purposes behind achieving such a citizenry differ, 
!d. 
No instruction, education, entertainment recreation or propaganda or activity of any 
kind which, in the opinion of the Director, is in any way of a political or party political 
nature and prejudicial to the public interest or the welfare of the pupils or of education 
generally or contrary to the approved syllabuses, shall be permitted upon any school 
premises or upon the occasion of any school activity. 
92 Morris, supra note 71, at 120. 
9:1 Id. 
94 Id. at 122. 
95 Id. at 120. 
96 See id. at 120-21. 
97 Morris, supra note 71, at 121. 
9H Id. 
99 Id. at 129. Support for teaching politics in the Hong Kong education system is not new. See 
id. In the 1970s, the Education Department dismissed several attempts to have a political educa-
tion. Id. The Department argued that teaching vulnerable children at such a young age about 
politics would be risky and subject children to undue political pressure. Morris, supra note 71, 
at 129. 
wo Id. 
101 Id. at 123. 
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depending on whether one consults the Hong Kong government or 
local communities. 102 The government hopes that such an education 
will prepare students to become better citizens of the PRC. 103 On the 
other hand, local communities desire to prepare the Hong Kong 
people for and to promote a more representative form of govern-
ment.104 Implicitly, this latter purpose aims to safeguard people from 
any intrusive governmental actions in the future. 
The return to Chinese sovereignty has made impacts on the three 
mechanisms which influence Hong Kong's curriculum: the examina-
tion syllabi via the HKEA, curriculum guidelines by the CDC, and 
classroom textbooks. 105 The HKEA has changed selected syllabi to 
accommodate political education. 106 On the other hand, the CDC has 
issued curriculum guidelines that remain apolitical.107 Textbooks have 
responded by casting a different light on history in the form of self-
censorship.108 
In particular, the HKEA has introduced a Government and Public 
Affairs (GPA) syllabus in 1989.109 Prior to the GPA syllabus, HKEA had 
a syllabus for Economics and Public Affairs (EPA) which covered the 
fundamentals of the Hong Kong government as well as Hong Kong's 
relationships with other governments. 110 The difference in the GPA is 
that it stresses the political processes and concepts central to Western 
democracies-the rule of law, representation, consultation, and elec-
tions.111 Nonetheless, instead of carrying a political doctrine, the po-
litical education offered by the HKEA teaches about the political con-
cepts in democracies. 112 Other syllabi, such as Chinese history and 
geography, remain apolitical. 113 Chosen texts from the PRC under 
these syllabi are distinctly apolitical and are balanced by texts written 
by Taiwanese authors.U4 
102 See id. 
1o3 Id. 
104 Morris, supra note 71, at 123. 
105 See id. at 120, 122. 
106 See id. at 124-28. 
107 ld. at 131. 
108 ld. at 137. 
109 Morris, supra note 71, at 127. 
110 See id. at 124-27. 
111 ld. at 129. 
112 See id. 
113 !d. at 130. 
114 Morris, supra note 71, at 130. 
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Curriculum guidelines have been modified differently.m In an effort 
to conform with the status quo, the CDC has issued guidelines that 
place greater emphasis on government institutions and on rights and 
responsibilities of a good citizen, rather than on particular political 
concepts. 116 The concept of democracy is specifically avoided, because 
the CDC posits that the concept means different things to different 
people. 117 In trying to focus on good citizenry, the curriculum guide-
lines attempt to remain apolitical. 118 
Textbook publishers have also made changes based on the current 
Hong Kong government's suggestions or far-sighted economic practi-
cality.119 At the government's suggestion, publishers have rewritten 
some of their texts to cast China in a positive light. 12° Furthermore, for 
fear of future censorship, publishers have also avoided including con-
troversial topics, such as the PRC's bloody suppression of student 
protests for democracy in 1989, in their texts. 121 
C. In the Eyes of the PRC 
Hong Kong's education system serves the Chinese favorably in a 
number of ways. In economic terms, it is in the best interest of the 
Chinese to preserve Hong Kong's internal systems, which include the 
education system, as they now stand. 122 As an international city, Hong 
Kong also plays a role in the PRC's push for modernization. 123 More-
over, Hong Kong's education system may well be a valuable resource 
for the training of the PRC's future political leaders in Hong Kong. 124 
Commentators have pointed out that the economic interests of the 
PRC safeguard the preservation of Hong Kong's education system. 125 
115 Id. at 131. 
116 Id. at 130. 
117 ld. at 131. 
118 ld. 
119 Morris, supra note 71, at 136-37. 
12° Id. at 137. 
121 ld. 
122 See MINERS, supra note 2, at 240; W.O. Lee, Pressure for Educational Excellence in China: 
Implications for Education in Hong Kong, in EDUCATION & SociETY, supra note 9, at 235, 244-45, 
248. 
123 Lee, supra note 122, at 243. 
124 See Postiglione, supra note 73, at 19-20; see also Basic Law, supra note 10, arts. 44, 61, 71, 
90. Under the Basic Law, high level public offices require candidates to have a residency require-
ment. See Basic Law, supra note 10, arts. 44, 61, 71, 90. As these requirements run up to twenty 
years in length, it is not unlikely that these leaders have also gone through the education system 
in Hong Kong. See id. 
125 See MINERS, supra note 2, at 240; Lee, supra note 122, at 245. 
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The PRC gains one-third of its foreign exchange earnings through 
Hong Kong each year. 126 Hong Kong is a vital channel between the 
PRC and the rest of the world for state-of-the-art foreign technology. 127 
Against this setting, the education system in Hong Kong has also 
gained significance because the Chinese view it as a "model of excel-
lence" for economic contribution. 128 
Formal attempts to study Hong Kong demonstrate the PRC's interest 
in Hong Kong, and especially in Hong Kong's education system. 129 
Since 1980, the Chinese have set up numerous institutes for the re-
search and study of Hong Kong. 130 The Academy of Social Sciences of 
China in Guangzhou, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, and 
the Hong Kong and Macao Research Institute at Zhongshan University 
are just some examples. 131 Research centers and institutes have also 
extensively published studies on Hong Kong and Macao since the 
1980s. 132 Although Hong Kong's economy has received the most atten-
tion, the PRC has also paid special attention to Hong Kong's education 
system. 133 
In addition to its relationship to economic prosperity, Hong Kong's 
education system is important to the PRC because it serves the PRC's 
ideological purposes. 134 The PRC has given praise to Hong Kong's 
education system as effectively catering to the needs of society. 135 As 
such, the education system could potentially be an effective channel 
for promoting the PRC's socialist ideals. 136 Furthermore, the education 
system serves as a training ground for the future leaders of the Hong 
Kong SAR.137 
Additional evidence of the important role of Hong Kong's education 
system in the eyes of the PRC is the increased academic interdepend-
126 Lee, supra note 122, at 243; see also Lo Ka-shui, "One Country, Two Systems" Concept Will 
Ensure Status as International Offshore Hub for Mainland; Territory must Strive for Key Role as 
China's Finance Centre, S. CHINA MoRNING PosT, July 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
Majpap File (noting Hong Kong as "capital formation centre" for China's economic modern-
ization programs). 
127 Lee, supra note 122, at 243. 
128Ju1ian YM. Leung, Education in Hong Kong and China: Toward Convergence?, in EDUCATION 
& SociETY, supra note 9, at 265, 267. 
129 See Lee, supra note 122, at 243. 
130 !d. 
131 !d. 
132 !d. at 244. 
133 Jd. 
!34 See Lee, supra note 122, at 245. 
135 Jd. 
136 See id. 
137 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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ence between Hong Kong and the PRC.138 In recent years, many PRC 
students have enrolled in Hong Kong's higher education institutions. 139 
Via the State Education Committee, the PRC has sent secondary school 
principals and teacher trainers into Hong Kong for training.14° Chinese 
bankers, international traders, hotel managers, and even mayors have 
arrived in Hong Kong for training in courses set up by Hong Kong 
industrialists.141 Conversely, Hong Kong scholars have gone into main-
land China for study.142 
In addition to the flux of scholars going in either direction, Hong 
Kong-PRC joint ventures in science have been growing. 143 The Biotech-
nology Institution of the Chinese University of Hong Kong has been 
cooperating with Shanghai counterparts in the PRC to disseminate 
biotechnical innovations throughout the world. 144 There has also been 
Hong Kong-PRC cooperation in the area of electronics. 145 It is likely 
that this academic interdependence will continue as 1997 ap-
proaches.146 
III. MoDERN CoNTEXT 
In examining the question of educational autonomy and academic 
freedom, sole reliance on the texts of the Joint Declaration and the 
Basic Law offers limited assistance. A more in-depth analysis necessi-
tates an examination into the surrounding context that gives life to the 
words in the documents. Looking at the PRC's own treatment of civil 
rights and liberties, its reaction to democratic reforms in Hong Kong, 
its treatment of the autonomy question for Taiwan, and current atti-
tudes and business trends in Hong Kong are all relevant to questioning 
the future of educational autonomy and academic freedom in Hong 
Kong. 
A. PRC's Treatment of Civil Rights 
An understanding of the PRC's current treatment of civil rights and 
liberties, among which is the right to education, requires a historical 
138 Leung, supra note 128, at 266-67. 




143 See Leung, supra note 128, at 267. 
144 /d. 
145 /d. 
146 /d. at 267-68. 
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perspective of the Chinese treatment of individual rights. 147 The idea 
of individual rights is Western in origin and does not necessarily coin-
cide with Chinese cultural and political thought.148 The Western con-
cept of individuality sees the person and her rights as sovereign. 149 As 
Deng Xiaoping pointed out, however, the Communist Party's "concept 
of human rights is different from that of the Western World, because 
[the Communist Party] see[s] the question from a different point of 
view. "150 Instead of having a place of sovereignty, an individual and her 
rights must be viewed within the context of her place in the family, the 
community, the country, and in ancient times, even in relation to 
heaven and earth. 151 
1. Historical Perspective 
The traditional Chinese approach to individual rights arises from 
the Confucian idea that an individual is not free-standing, but is always 
perceived as a member of a group. 152 As a result, an individual's rights 
and interests are connected to and subject to the group's interests and 
priorities.153 In the family, filial piety is of first priority. 154 At the state 
level, absolute loyalty and obedience to the ruler are the key tenets. 155 
Confucianism places people and their rights in a hierarchical struc-
ture: rulers over their subjects, husbands over their wives, and parents 
over their children. 156 
As China has moved into its modern age of thought, despite hopeful 
aspirations for individual rights, the interest of the greater society has 
remained the dominant force. 157 During the early twentieth century, 
147 Albert H.Y Chen, Civil Liberties in China: Some Preliminary Observations, in CIVIL LIBERTIES 
IN HONG KONG 107, 107 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1988). 
148 Anne Carver, Freedom of Religion, in HuMAN RIGHTS IN HoNG KoNG 350, 356 (Raymond 
Wacks ed., 1992); see also Tsang Yok-Sing, Remaining Problems Must Be Addressed, S. CHINA 
MoRNING PosT, July 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File (reporting Hong 
Kong people fear "what China means by those promises [in Basic Law which includes personal 
freedoms] is drastically different from what Hong Kong people would want to understand"). 
149Carver, supra note 148, at 358. 
150 Jd. at 356 (citing DENG XIAOPING, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN PRESENT DAY CHINA 115 (1987) 
[hereinafter DENG XIAOPING]). 
151 See Chen, supra note 147, at 108-09. 
152 !d. at 109. 
153 Jd. 
154 !d. at 108. In the traditional Chinese sense, filial piety involves respect of and submission to 
elders in the family. 
155 !d. 
156SPENCE, supra note 15, at 60. 
157 See generally Chen, supra note 147, at 109-13. 
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Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, considered the founding father of the Republic of 
China, created an influential ideology which offered hope for individ-
ual civil rights.158 Full implementation of this ideology would establish 
a constitutional government under which a separation of powers ex-
isted and sovereignty of government rested in the people. 159 The road 
to such a government consisted of a stage, however, which granted the 
Kuomintang (KMT) 160 a more dominant position over other political 
parties. 161 Unfortunately, it was at this second stage that the KMT 
stopped.162 
The subsequent rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 
China did not offer more concrete hope for individual rights either. 163 
Fueled by the Communist Party's belief that it was the "supreme and 
infallible custodian of truth,"164 the government of the PRC openly and 
severely violated Western ideas of individual liberties and human 
rights. 165 While striving for a "classless society" during the Cultural 
Revolution of 1966, Mao and his followers branded human rights and 
dignity as bourgeois and antithetical to the revolution. 166 As the driving 
force and cultic figure of the Communist Party, Mao advocated that 
"enemies"167 to the Party were to be given "severe sanctions and de-
158 !d. at ll 0-ll. 
159 Id. at Ill. 
160 Id. at 110. Kuomintang (KMT) or Guomindang is the romanized Chinese name for the 
Nationalist Party. !d. Sun was also considered the founding father of this party. Chen, supra note 
147, at llO. Later, Chiang Kai-shek led the KMT when they withdrew to Taiwan in the 1940s. 
SPENCE, supra note 15, at 525. 
161 Chen, supra note 147, at Ill. Sun saw this as a necessary step, because he feared that people 
unfamiliar with the exercise of democratic rights would create chaos. !d. 
162 See id. at ll2. 
163 See id. 
164 Id. at 115. In 1955-1956, when Hu Feng, a poet and literary theorist, criticized the Party 
and demanded a greater amount of literary and artistic freedom, he became the object of 
persecutory campaigns. Chen, supra note 147, at 117. In 1956, the Party encouraged people to 
speak out in criticism of the Party in its "Hundred Flowers Movement." !d. The subsequent 
persecutions of critics, including judges on the Supreme People's Court, rendered the call for 
criticism dubious at best. Id. 
165 See, e.g., infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text. 
166SeeChen, supra note 147, at llS-19. 
167 Id. at 115. In his speech, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," 
Mao purported that there were two "contradictions" that needed to be addressed. !d. at 114-15. 
One existed among the "people," loosely defined as those for the Party, and the other among 
the "enemies," who were against the Party. !d. at 115. The definition of "enemies" was vague and 
varied from time to time. !d. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that the Communists perceived anything 
Western, such as human rights, to be the "enemy." Chen, supra note 147, at ll5, 119. 
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prived of all their rights. "168 The Communists faithfully carried out 
Mao's desires with severe repression. 169 
Since the tumultuous Cultural Revolution, many improvements have 
been made to the legal structure of the Chinese government that offer 
some hope for human rights. 170 Law schools and lawyers have reap-
peared and the government encourages people to exercise their legal 
rights. 171 Furthermore, the idea of ruling the country "by law" and 
"according to law" serves as a departure from the previous authoritar-
ian attitudes of the CCP. 172 Nonetheless, the existence of a constitution 
does not guarantee human rights. 173 In fact, the 1982 Constitution is 
the PRC's fourth constitution; the prior three were in 1954, 1975, and 
1978.174 
Despite the years of human rights and individual liberties' rhetoric, 
this historic backdrop provides the necessary lens through which we 
should view the present "rights" granted to the citizens of the PRC. As 
a result, this Note's examination of the rights guaranteed to the people 
under the 1982 Constitution looks beyond the words of the text and 
considers the context as well. Insight gleaned from such an examina-
tion lends focus to the question of whether or not educational freedom 
and other such rights, although "guaranteed" in the Basic Law, will 
likely survive in post-1997 Hong Kong. 
2. Current Civil Rights in the 1982 Constitution 
Chapter Two of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China 
of 4 December 1982 (PRC Constitution or 1982 Constitution) enumer-
ates citizens' rights under "The Fundamental Rights and Duties of 
Citizens."175 The PRC Constitution provides that all people are equal 
under the law. 176 Political rights and freedoms, religious freedom, per-
sonal freedom, and the freedom of speech, publication, assembly, 
16B ld. at 115. 
169 !d. at 116. During the PRC's campaigns to purge itself of "enemies," ad hoc tribunals accused 
and subjected "enemies" to physical and verbal abuse without a chance to defend themselves. !d. 
Invariably, the end result of such trials were the death penalty or lengthy sentences to labor camps. 
!d. 
170 SeeChen, supra note 147, at 120. 
171 See id. 
172 !d. 
173 See id. at 121; supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. 
174 Chen, supra note 147, at 121. 
175 XIANFA ch. 2. 
176 !d. art. 33. 
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association, procession, and demonstration are in the PRC Constitu-
tion. 177 The right to make complaints and charges against the govern-
ment for state infringement of civil rights also exists. 178 Of relevance to 
this Note is the PRC's constitutional "right to receive education," as 
stated in Article 46.179 
The presence of such an extensive list of citizens' rights is a welcome 
departure from past constitutions.180 Taken literally, such guarantees 
would appear to grant citizens individual liberties that are comparable 
to those found in the United States and other Western nations. 181 The 
context surrounding these rights would prove otherwise.182 
3. Rights with Strings Attached 
Limitations to the enumerated citizens' rights under the 1982 Con-
stitution arise from the difference in perspective and attitude towards 
human rights. 183 Chinese jurists argue that Western notions of human 
rights benefit the capitalists who have the property and power; working 
people have no such guaranteed rights. 184Jurists in the PRC allege that 
it is only under a socialist system that constitutional rights can be 
guaranteed even to the working classes. 185 It is within the framework of 
177 !d. arts. 34-40. 
178 !d. art. 41. 
179 See id. art. 46. Article 46 of the PRC Constitution provides that "Citizens of the People's 
Republic of China have the duty as well as the right to receive education. The state promotes the 
all-round moral, intellectual and physical development of children and young people." XIANFA 
art. 46. 
1so Chen, supra note 147, at 121. 
181 See U.S. CoNST. amend. I.; BELG. CoN ST. tit. II; CaNST. (1958) pmbl. (Fr.), reprinted in JoHN 
BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 245 (1992) (hereinafter FR. CONST.]; THE DECLARATION OF 
THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN, 1789 arts. 10-11, reprinted in BELL, supra, at 261 
[hereinafter DECLARATION]. Much of the language found in this list echoes the language of rights 
found in the constitutions of the United States, Belgium, and France. The First Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution contains similar rights: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances." U.S. CaNST. amend. I. Also, in the Belgian Constitution, the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of the people include rights to respect for private and family life, 
freedom of worship and its public exercise, the right to education, and freedom of assembly and 
association. BELG. CaNST. arts. 19-24. In France, the religious freedom and freedom of commu-
nication of ideas and of opinions are also guaranteed. FR. CoNST. pmbl.; DECLARATION, supra, 
arts. 10-11. 
182 See generally Chen, supra note 147, at 121-26. 
183 See id. at 120, 122. 
184 !d. at 120-21. 
185 !d. at 121. 
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a socialist society, then, that this Note should examine the rights under 
the 1982 Constitution. 
Under the 1982 Constitution, the exercise of individual freedoms 
and rights are not unfettered, but are tied to performances of pre-
scribed duties. 186 Instead of a sole individualistic perspective of these 
rights, the emphasis is on the government-the greater society.187 Thus, 
the PRC Constitution refers to ''work and receiving an education as 
both a right and a duty of citizens."188 Such a treatment of individual 
rights is characteristic in socialist nations. 189 This is consistent with 
China's historical treatment of individual rights as well. 190 
In addition to being coupled with a duty, individual rights in the 
Constitution are only as good as the legislation that enforces these 
rights.191 The existence of statutes can bolster the constitutional guar-
antees of individual rights.192 The lack oflegislation, however, frustrates 
the implementation of individual rights.193 Without legislation, there is 
no statutory basis for a cause of action to be brought when these rights 
are not enforced. 194 
4. Freedom of Religion as an Example 
Similar to the right to education, the freedom of religion is a guar-
anteed right.195 In practice, however, it is fettered, and not an absolute 
right.196 Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution states that citizens have the 
right to "enjoy freedom of religious belief."197 It continues, however, to 
186 ld. at 122. 
187 Chen, supra note 14 7, at 122. 
188 !d. 
189 Jd. 
190 See supra notes 152-74 and accompanying text. 




195 XIANFA art. 36. 
196 See Carver, supra note 148, at 354-56. 
197XIANFA art. 36. Article 36 States: 
Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. 
No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, 
or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe 
in, or do not believe in, any religion. 
The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to 
engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere 
with the educational system of the state. 
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say that "the state protects normal religious activities. "198 Further, the 
constitution makes it clear that "religious bodies and religious affairs 
are not subject to any foreign domination. "199 These two points raise 
doubts of whether or not religious freedom truly exists. 
Language in Article 36 defines "normal" to exclude "activities that 
disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the 
educational system of the state."200 Thus, one's right to practice any 
religion seems to be limited to what religious practices the government 
would define as "normal. "201 In 1990, a newspaper article reported that 
religion posed a threat to the "physical and psychological health" of 
students.202 Additionally, the report stated that "[c]hurch attendance 
harms students' concentration and leads to dropping grades. "203 This 
report, in conjunction with the language of Article 36, leaves one 
wondering what types of religious practice are "normal," and naturally, 
what, if anything, remains of the right to "enjoy freedom of religious 
belief. "204 
B. PRC's Reaction to Democratic Reforms 
The Basic Law provides for a democratic government and universal 
suffrage for electing the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong SAR and 
all the members of the LegCo.205 When the Governor of Hong Kong 
advocated for democratic reforms that edged towards universal suf-
Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination. 
!d. 
198 Id. (emphasis added). 
199 !d. 
200 !d. 
201 See Carver, supra note 148, at 362-63. 
202 !d. (quoting an article in the S. China Morning Post on Sept. 4, 1990). 
!d. 
Religion poses a danger to students' physical and psychological health. The Worker's 
Daily expressed alarm yesterday at the growing number of Chinese students who admit 
to holding religious beliefs and called for authorities to "take effective measures." [Sic] 
A recent survey in the eastern province of Zhejiang found that 871 students of 6,400 
polled said they believed in God. Of the believers, 627 were regular church-goers. The 
numbers are increasing. This belief in religion poses a danger to students' physical and 
psychological health. Church attendance harms students' concentration and leads to 
dropping grades. "Because of their belief in religion, a lot of students accepted idealism 
and theism which affected their healthy growth." 
203 !d. 
2°4 See XIANFA art. 36; infra notes 304-09 and accompanying text. 
205Basic Law, supra note 10, arts. 45, 68. 
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frage m 1992, however, the PRC's response was less than positive. 206 
Such a response also sheds light onto the PRC's sincerity in upholding 
other promises, including that of educational autonomy and academic 
freedom in the future Hong Kong SAR. 
On July 9, 1992, Chris Patten assumed the office of the Governor of 
Hong Kong.207 In his very first public address on October 7, 1992, 
Patten made it clear to the people that his goal was to increase democ-
racy through more direct representation. 208 His democratic reforms 
included lowering the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen, chang-
ing the electoral process of the indirectly elected legislators, and hav-
ing the appointed municipal and district board members elected.209 
Patten also suggested creating "single vote, single-seat constituencies" 
which would expand the franchise in so-called functional constituen-
cies. 210 
The PRC responded to Patten's address with threats and insults. 211 
The foreign ministry spokesman for the PRC, Wu Jianmin, said that 
these reforms would obstruct a smooth transition of governments in 
1997.212 He asserted that the PRC maintains that the current Hong 
206 Beijing Rejects Prrtposed Democratic RRforms in Hong Kong, Agence Fr. Presse, Oct. 8, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Int'l File [hereinafter Beij'ing Rejects]. 
207 Patten's Stormy Two Years in Office-A Chronology, Reuters World Serv., June 30, 1994, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File [hereinafter Patten's Stormy Two Years]. 
208 Bryan A. Gregory, Envisioning Futures: The Battle Over Democracy in Hong Kong, 19 N.C.]. 
INl·'L L. & CoM. REc. 175, 183 (1993). 
2°9 !d. at 183-84. 
210 Beijing Rejects, supra note 206. Functionary constituencies represent occupational groups 
ranging from workers in the textile industry to financial services. Edward A. Gargan, Pro-China 
Party Appears Big Loser in Hong Kong Election, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1995, at AS [hereinafter 
Gargan, Pro-China Party]. 
2ll Patten's Stormy Two Years, supra note 207. Further evidence of the PRC' s negative reaction 
to Patten's democratic reforms are its daily launches of verbal attacks and its threat to disregard 
any contract extending beyond 1997 which was entered into without its approval. David Stamp, 
China Threat Triggers 5.3 Percent Drop in Hong Kong Shares, Reuters Bus. Rep., Dec. 1, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File [hereinafter China Threat]. This threat sent the 
Hong Kong stock index, the Hang Seng, plunging 433 points on December 3, 1992. Patten's 
Stormy Two Years, supra note 207. This was the largest drop since the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
massacre of students. !d. Between November 30 and December 3, the Hang Seng Index dropped 
1,008 points, or 16.8 percent. Gregory, supra note 208, at 190. One economist commented that 
such threats from the PRC were no surprise: "I wouldn't be surprised if the Chinese side is willing 
to allow the Hong Kong economy to deteriorate to such an extent that China wins that political 
battle and then it will do whatever it can to recover these losses." China Threat, supra. The PRC 
had hoped to persuade the business sector to pressure Patten into retreating from his democratic 
reforms. !d. 
212 Beijing Rejects, supra note 206. 
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Kong political system should not undergo major changes. 213 Further-
more, he said that the proposed changes did not comply with the Basic 
Law, and hence, violated a provision of the Joint Declaration that 
requires the British to consult with the PRC before such changes are 
implemented.214 He further hinted that the PRC would not be respon-
sible for any changes not consistent with the Basic Law.215 Some com-
mentators have interpreted this comment to mean that the PRC would 
reverse any changes made by the British once 1997 arrives on the 
grounds that such developments are contrary to the Basic Law.216 
Throughout the debate over the democratic reforms, the PRC re-
peatedly alleged that these reforms were in violation of the Basic Law.217 
In fact, the PRC had gone as far as saying that the Basic Law may no 
longer be valid. 218 The PRC has even vowed to move ahead with its own 
plans for post-1997 Hong Kong, regardless of British efforts.219 Spe-
cifically, the PRC's Foreign Ministry and its Hong Kong and Macao 
Mfairs Office pledged that any system created, including the legisla-
ture, in the twilight years before 1997 would be "scrapped" on July 1, 
1997.220 
Mter almost two years of unresolved confrontation with the PRC, the 
Hong Kong Legislative Council passed Patten's proposals on June 30, 
1994.221 The Council passed the democratic reforms with a vote of 
thirty-two to twenty-four.222 In response, the PRC vowed to dismantle 
the Legislative Council once the PRC takes over on July 1, 1997.223 
The PRC's threats to dismantle what would be Hong Kong's newly 
elected Legislative Council were not empty ones. 224 Only one week after 
Patten's victory, the PRC government charged an advisory committee 
213 ld. 
214 Patten Challenges China to Say How He Violates Pact, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 10, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File [hereinafter Patten Challenges]. 
215 Beijing Rejects, supra note 206. 
216 Id.; Gregory, supra note 208, at 185. 
217 Gregory, supra note 208, at 184. 
218 !d. at 190 n.1 08. 
219 China Steps Up Attack on Patten s Hong Kong Plan, Reuters, Dec. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, 
News Library, Non-US File [hereinafter China Steps Up Attack]. 
220 Diane Stormont, HK Governor Presses on with Democratic Reforms, Reuters, Feb. 24, 1994, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File. 
221 HK Legislature Approves Patten's Reforms, Reuters World Serv., June 30, 1994, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File [hereinafter HK Legislature]. 
222 ld. 
223 ld. 
224 China Again Denounces Hong Kong Democratic Reforms, Reuters, July 7, 1993, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File [hereinafter China Again Denounces]. 
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to put together a new legislature for the Hong Kong SAR once the 
PRC regains sovereignty.225 On August 31, 1994, the PRC issued a legal 
regulation which would abolish Hong Kong's political structure.226 The 
regulation states, "[T]he last legislative council, city government, dis-
trict government and district board will be terminated on June 30, 
1997. "227 The PRC justified this regulation on the grounds that Patten's 
democratic reforms were against both the spirit and the letter of the 
previous Sino-British agreements, including the Joint Declaration and 
the Basic Law.228 As further confirmation of this act, on March 24, 1996, 
the advisory committee put together by the PRC also voted to replace 
the democratically elected legislature once Hong Kong returns to the 
PRC.229 
C. PRC's Treatment of Taiwan and its Autonomy 
North of Hong Kong, up along the eastern coast of the PRC is the 
island of Taiwan.230 As with Hong Kong, the government of the PRC 
has considered Taiwan a part of its own territory and has plans to 
225 !d. 
226 David Schlesinger, China Approves Measure to Abolish HK Legislature, Reuters World Serv., 
Aug. 31, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, Non-US File [hereinafter Schlesinger, China 
Approves Measure]. 
227 !d. Despite the threats of the PRC, 35.S percent of registered voters showed up for Hong 
Kong's first full election on September 17, 1995 to elect the very "last" government which the 
PRC will be terminating. Gargan, Pro-China Party, supra note 210, at AS. Under Governor Patten's 
democratic reforms, this was the first election where all sixty of the Legislative Council members 
were elected: twenty directly by the people, thirty from members of thirty occupational groups, 
and ten chosen by a committee of local district officials. !d. Martin C.M. Lee, chairman of the 
Democratic Party, hailed the results of the election as "a mandate for democratic government in 
Hong Kong and real constitutional, legal and human rights reform to ensure basic freedoms in 
Hong Kong after 1997." Edward A. Gargan, China and Hong Kong Victors Square Off After the 
Election, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1995, at AS. Regardless of the results, the PRC government 
announced its firm stance in disbanding this legislature once July I, 1997 arrives. !d.; see also 
China Says Door Closed to Debate on HK LegCo, Reuters, Jan. 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, Non-US File. 
228 Schlesinger, China Approves Measure, supra note 226. 
229 Elected Legislature in Hong Kong to End, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1996, at A9 [hereinafter Elected 
Legislature]. 
230 SPENCE, supra note 15, at 53-54. As early as the seventeenth century, Chinese pioneers from 
the Guangdong and Fujian provinces crossed the straits into the island of Taiwan. !d. In 16S3, 
Emperor Kangxi, the second emperor of the Qing dynasty, defeated the Zheng forces and 
annexed Taiwan to his empire. !d. at 56. It was not until1SS5, however, that the Qing government 
officially recognized Taiwan as a province. !d. at 210. 
In 1S95, as a result of the Sino-Japanese War from 1S94 through 1S95, the Qing ceded Taiwan, 
along with other territories, to the Japanese "in perpetuity." !d. at 223. For almost fifty years, 
Taiwan developed and prospered economically as a colony of Japan. SPENCE, supra note 15, at 
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reuni£Y231 the island of Taiwan with the mainland.232 In an address, PRC 
Prime Minister Li Peng announced that China's approach to reunifica-
tion with Taiwan would mirror the same "one country, two systems" 
approach that is to govern the Hong Kong SAR.233 Implicit in this 
statement is that both Hong Kong and Taiwan will enjoy the same level 
of autonomy under the PRC.234 Thus, the military exercises of the PRC 
against Taiwan are relevant in forecasting what level of autonomy the 
future Hong Kong SAR will enjoy.235 This level of autonomy will also 
determine whether educational autonomy and academic freedom will 
continue in Hong Kong. 
Almost fifty years since the civil war between the two governments, 
the PRC and Taiwanese governments are still grappling with the ques-
tion of reunification.236 Despite successful talks between the two gov-
509. It was not until 1945 that the Chinese under Chiang's KMT regained control of Taiwan. I d. 
at 509-10. 
In 1949, when Mao and his Communist forces ousted the KMT from mainland China, Taiwan 
became the new base for the KMT. ld. at 509-10, 525. 
231 Commentators have used both terms "reunifY" and "unifY" to refer to the PRC's desire to 
gain complete sovereignty over Taiwan in the near future. Taiwan: Mainland's Plan for Reunifica-
tion Sparks jitters, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Jan. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, 
Txtfe File [hereinafter Taiwan: Mainland's Plan]. For the sake of consistency, this Note will use 
the term "reunifY" and its derivatives. Justification for this choice lies in the fact that during the 
Qing dynasty, Taiwan was a formal province of China until its cession to Japan in 1895. SPENCE, 
supra note 15, at 210. 
232 Text of joint Communique Issued at Shanghai, 131 DEP'T ST. NEWSL. 10, 10-11 (Mar. 1972) 
[hereinafter Shanghai Communiquel; Patrick E. Tyler, China Hints at a Timetable To Take Control 
of Taiwan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1996, at A2 [hereinafter Tyler, China Hints at Timetable]. On 
February 28, 1972, the PRC and the U.S. governments issued a joint communique in Shanghai. 
Shanghai Communique, supra, at 10. In addressing the question of Taiwan, the communique stated 
the following: 
The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations 
between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of 
China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has 
long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair 
in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military 
installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes 
any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan, " "One China, two 
governments, " "two Chinas, " and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of 
Taiwan remains to be determined. " 
ld. at 10--11 (emphasis added). 
233 Tyler, China Hints at Timetable, supra note 232, at A2. 
234 See id. 
235 See China: Taiwan Move "Would Put HK At Risk," S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Feb. 7, 1996, 
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Txtfe File. 
236 Taiwan: A Chronology of Mounting China-Taiwan Tensions, Reuters News Serv.-Far East, Mar. 
11, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Txtfe File [hereinafter Taiwan Chronology]. 
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ernments in May 1995, recent events have put a snag in the reunifica-
tion talks. 237 In June of 1995, Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui arrived 
in the United States in order to attend a reunion at his alma mater, 
Cornell University. 238 The PRC interpreted this visit as an attempt by 
President Lee to promote the independence of Taiwan. 239 As a result, 
the PRC postponed further talks on the reunification process and 
disclosed its ill feelings towards Taiwan's alleged insincerity in the 
reunification process.240 
In subsequent months, the PRC threatened Taiwan with military 
action. 241 The PRC fired six missiles just north of Taiwan, held a series 
of missile tests, and broadcasted scenes of threatening military exer-
cises over national television on more than one occasion.242 All of these 
attempts, analysts argue, resulted in a victory for the party most sym-
pathetic to the PRC in the parliamentary elections on December 2, 
1995.243 Meanwhile, the PRC announced that it would not tolerate any 
action taken by the Taiwanese to declare their own independence.244 
The PRC continued to strongly affirm that Taiwan is an inalienable 
part of the PRC.245 It further announced that although it hopes to 
attain reunification through peaceful means, nothing precludes appli-
cation of force. 246 
As Taiwan's first direct presidential elections approached on March 
23, 1996, the tension in the Taiwan Strait mounted.247 The PRC saw the 
presidential election as a legal cover for Taiwan President Lee Teng-
hui's move towards Taiwanese independence.248 The PRC affirmed that 
any move towards Taiwanese independence would encounter a military 
response from the mainland.249 On March 8, 1996, the PRC launched 
237 !d. 
238 !d. 
239 China: China Gives No Timetable on Taiwan Unity, Jan. 30, 1996, Reuter News Serv.-Far East, 
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Txtfe File [hereinafter China: China Gives]; Taiwan Chronol-
ogy, supra note 236. 
240 Taiwan Chronology, supra note 236; see also Tyler, China Hints at Timetable, supra note 232, 
atA2. 
241 Taiwan Chronology, supra note 236; Tyler, China Hints at Timetable, supra note 232, at A2. 
242 Taiwan Chronology, supra note 236. 
243 !d. 
244 See Taiwan: Mainland's Plan, supra note 231. 
245 China: China Gives, supra note 239. 
246 !d. 
247 Patrick E. Tyler, War Games Off Taiwan To Expand, Beijing Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1996, 
at 12. 
248 Patrick E. Tyler, China Says Maneuvers Will Last Through Taiwan's Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
16, 1996, at 5 [hereinafter Tyler, China Says]. 
249 Tyler, China Hints At Timetable, supra note 232, at A2. 
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three unarmed ballistic missiles at Taiwan.250 The next day, it an-
nounced that additional war games would continue from March 12 to 
20.251 On March 15, however, the PRC extended its exercises by an-
nouncing that it would conduct joint ground, naval, and air exercises 
on a large scale from March 18 to 25, 1996.252 For the PRC to stop such 
exercises, it told the Taiwanese government that they would have to 
abandon dreams of independence.253 As with the previous round of 
military exercises, analysts argue that the PRC once again was trying 
to influence the presidential elections.254 
Analysts point out that this series of threats from the PRC to Taiwan 
arose from principles of sovereignty and nationalism.255 Mter a "cen-
tury of humiliation" from losing Hong Kong, Macao,256 and Taiwan, 
the PRC government was out to avenge its humiliation and to regain 
its sovereignty.257 In defense of the PRC's exercises, Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Shen Guofang said, "There is nothing more important 
than safeguarding the nation's sovereignty."258 Analysts point out that 
for the sake of nationalism, the PRC would be willing to overlook any 
economic costs and disregard any detrimental political aftermath. 259 
This attitude of suppressing the PRC's subordinates bodes unfavorably 
for Hong Kong's future autonomy. 
~50 Joyce Liu, Taiwan: China Starts Missile Tests Off Taiwan, Reuter News Serv.-Far East, Mar. 
8, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Txtfe File. 
251 China: China Tells Taiwan to Drop Independence Dreams, Reuter News Serv.-Far East, Mar. 
11, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Txtfe File [hereinafter China Tells Taiwan]. 
252 Tyler, China Says, supra note 248, at 5. 
253 China Tells Taiwan, supra note 251. 
254 Kwan Chooi Tow, Hong Kong: China Plans to Scare, Not Invade Taiwan-Experts, Reuters 
News Serv.-Far East, Feb. 5, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Txtfe File; see also Seth 
Faison, Tensions Seen as Receding as China Ends War Games, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1996, at AS. On 
March 23, 1996, the elections proceeded as planned and yielded a victory for the incumbent 
President Lee. Patrick E. Tyler, Taiwan's Leader Wins Its Election and a Mandate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
24, 1996, at l. On March 25, 1996, the PRC announced that its military exercises against Taiwan 
had ended. Faison, supra. With the elections over, both sides showed conciliatory gestures as the 
tension between the two governments receded. ld. 
255 Paul Eckert, China: Sovereignty Obsession Makes China Tough on Taiwan, Reuter News Serv., 
Mar. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Txtfe File. 
256 China: China Gives, supra note 239. Macao is a region currently run by the Portuguese 
government. !d. In 1999, however, the Portuguese will return Macao to the PRC,just as the British 
will return Hong Kong in 1997. !d. 
257 Eckert, supra note 255. 
2S8 Jd. 
259 Jd. 
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D. Current Economic Trend and People's Attitudes 
Hong Kong's recent attitudes, especially those of people in business 
and education, towards the PRC's return to sovereignty, potentially 
impacts the question of educational autonomy and academic freedom 
as well. The education system is closely tied to the economic success 
of Hong Kong. 260 Additionally, academic freedom is dependent, in 
part, on the presence of scholars and educators. 
As 1997 approaches, with the Basic Law guarantees in place and with 
steady economic numbers, the Hong Kong economy appears unaf-
fected.261 The Basic Law guarantees that the current economic systems 
in Hong Kong will remain unchanged. 262 Laws will protect private 
property and international investments.263 Hong Kong will retain the 
status of a free port, continue to operate as an international financial 
center, and circulate its current convertible currency.264 Furthermore, 
the Hong Kong SAR will retain its own finances. 265 As for numbers, the 
Gross Domestic Product in Hong Kong has increased every year since 
1986 and the incorporation of new companies in Hong Kong outnum-
bers those shutting down. 266 
The reality of recent business attitudes in Hong Kong paints another 
picture.267 The imminent return to PRC sovereignty, coupled with a 
general mistrust of the PRC, has brought about an exodus of resources 
from Hong Kong. 268 A substantial outflow of capital-up to an annual 
rate of $3 billion (U.S.)-has been leaving Hong Kong.269 There has 
also been a mass exodus of high level management, which has encour-
aged less qualified people to move up the ranks and has brought about 
a deterioration in Hong Kong's standards of efficiency.27° Furthermore, 
some major businesses have relocated their headquarters from Hong 
Kong to other places so as to be out of the PRC's reach. 271 
260 See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
261 See MINERS, supra note 2, at 240. 
262Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(5), at 1372. 
263 /d. 
264 /d. para. 3(6)-(7), at 1372. 
265 /d. para. 3(8), at 1372. 
266MINERS, supra note 2, at 240. 
267 See id. at 240-41. 
268 /d. at 240. 
269 /d. (citing an article by John Greenwood in the Asian Wall Street journal on Mar. 14, 1990). 
27° MINERS, supra note 2, at 241. 
27! /d. In light of what happened to their properties after the Communist takeover in 1949, 
firms such as .Jardine Matheson and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation have 
moved their domicile holding companies to places such as London and Bermuda. /d. 
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Despite the guarantees of autonomy and capitalism set forth in the 
Basic Law, the business people in Hong Kong evince a general sense 
of mistrust and anxiety as 1997 approaches.272 Emigration trends show 
that up to 45,000 people left Hong Kong in 1989 and 62,000 left in 
1990.273 An additional estimated 66,000 people left in 1992 and 53,000 
left in 1993.274 At least a quarter of these emigrants includes entrepre-
neurs, managers, graduates, and professionally qualified staff. 275 This 
outflow of highly qualified professionals from Hong Kong, or "brain 
drain," has alarmed the government to the point of actively expanding 
the universities and polytechnics. 276 The government hopes that such 
efforts will increase the annual output of college graduates. 277 A dearth 
of professionals and academicians could pose a threat to the field of 
education on the whole. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROMISE OF EDUCATIONAL 
AuTONOMY AND AcADEMIC FREEDOM 
A. Guarantees in the Law Regarding Education 
According to the guarantees of the Joint Declaration and the Basic 
Law, the same level of academic freedom experienced under the cur-
rent education system will remain. 278 The Joint Declaration states that 
2i2Jd. 
2n Id. Emigration numbers are government estimates. MINERS, supra note 2, at 241. These do 
not take into account those who have unofficially emigrated from Hong Kong and those who 
have taken up foreign citizenship but are back in Hong Kong for business. ld. 
m Scott McKenzie & Wanda Szeto, Exodus Set to Shift up a Gear as 1997 Nears, S. CHINA 
MoRNING PosT, Oct. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File. Hong Kong 
residents have sought homes in other countries such as Canada, Australia, the United States, and 
the U.K. Kevin Murphy, Hong Kong Seems Ripe for Exodus; Wei Trial Further Weakens Trust in 
Beijing's Rule, lNT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File. 
Of these countries, Canada remains a favorite. John Duce, Door is Still Open Jar HK Families, S. 
CHINA MoRNING PosT, July 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File. For seven 
years in a row, Hong Kong residents outnumber all other foreign emigrants to Canada. McKenzie 
& Szeto, supra. Hong Kong emigres make up about 20 percent of new Canadian immigrants, 
which is close to 50,000 people. Duce, supra. The number of Hong Kong emigrants to Australia 
has also been significant. See Australia Reports Surge in Immigrants from Hong Kong, Agence Fr. 
Presse, May 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File. Of the people who left Hong 
Kong between 1985 and 1991, more than one quarter settled in Australia. Id. Besides Britain, 
Hong Kong is the next largest source of immigrants into the country. !d. The number of Hong 
Kong-born residents in Australia increased from 28,293 in 1986 to 57,510 in 1991. ld. 
275 MINERS, supra note 2, at 240-41. 
276 !d. at 241. 
277 Jd. 
27HBasic Law, supra note 10, arts. 136-37;Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(5), at 1372. 
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the change in sovereignty over Hong Kong will not affect the current 
social and economic systems. 279 In fact, these systems will remain as they 
are for the next fifty years until 204 7. 280 More specifically, the Basic Law 
states that the future Hong Kong SAR will be able to run its education 
system as it currently does.281 A look at the underlying meanings behind 
the words found in these Basic Law guarantees shows otherwise. 
The Basic Law sets forth more than once that the education system 
will continue as is.282 It provides that "[o]n the basis of the previous 
educational system," i.e., the system under British rule, Hong Kong 
may continue to formulate policies regarding the different aspects of 
its education system.283 As for educational institutions, they "may con-
tinue to recruit staff and use teaching materials from outside the Hong 
Kong [SAR]."284 
The Basic Law also ensures a high level of educational autonomy. 285 
It states that the Hong Kong SAR "shall, on its own, formulate policies 
on the development and improvement of education."286 Schools also 
"may retain their autonomy. "287 Additionally, the Basic Law guarantees 
that students in Hong Kong "shall enjoy freedom of choice" and 
"freedom to pursue their education."288 
The language of both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law 
assures Hong Kong students and educators the preservation of aca-
demic freedom and educational autonomy.289 Reliance on the words of 
these provisions would thus necessitate a thorough analysis of their 
true meanings to properly assess whether enough safeguards really 
exist. Merely looking at the words of the documents without looking 
at the context in which the PRC sets forth these promises would be 
myopic.290 Promises merely made in documents have historically been 
insufficient to safeguard the rights purported to be offered.291 
2' 9Joint Declaration, supra note I, para. 3(5), annex I,§ I, at I372-73. 
280 !d. 
281 See Basic Law, supra note IO, art. I36. 
282 See id. 
283 !d. 
284Jd. art. 137 (emphasis added). 
285 See id. arts. I36-37. 
286 Basic Law, supra note 10, art. I36 (emphasis added). 
287 !d. art. I37. 
288 !d. 
289 !d. arts. I36-37; see also joint Declaration, supra note I, para. 3(5), at I372. 
290 See supra notes I83-204 and accompanying text. 
291 See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text. 
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1. Underlying Meaning of Individual Freedoms 
Despite the similarities in the words used by the PRC and those used 
by other Western nations, such as the United States and Belgium, in 
regard to individual rights, the PRC has a different concept of individ-
ual rights.292 Unlike the West, the PRC perceives these individual rights 
as subordinate to the interest of the greater society, not as sovereign.293 
The difference in the PRC's meaning of individual rights is relevant to 
assessing the validity of the Basic Law's promises for academic freedom. 
One example is the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom in 
the PRC, the United States, and Belgium.294 Under the PRC's 1982 
Constitution, Article 36 states that individuals have the right to "enjoy 
the freedom of religious belief' and that "[n]o state organ, public 
organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to 
believe in, any religion. "295 This language is similar to the language 
found in both the constitutions of the United States and Belgium.296 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress 
shall make no law establishing or prohibiting the free exercise of 
religion.297 The Belgian Constitution provides that "[f]reedom of wor-
ship and its public exercise ... are guaranteed," and that the state shall 
not interfere with religious matters.298 
The reality of religious exercise in the PRC shows, however, that the 
context surrounding the guarantee of religious freedom makes a no-
ticeable difference. 299 The PRC limits its protection of religious activi-
ties to those that are "normal. "300 According to a newspaper report in 
292 See Carver, supra note 148 (citing DENG XIAOPING, supra note 150). 
293 See Chen, supra note 147, at 108-09. 
294 See U.S. CoNST. amend. I; BELG. CONST. arts. 19-21; XIANFA art. 36. 
295 XIANFA art. 36. 
296 Compare id. with U.S. CaNsT. amend. I and BELG. CaNST. arts 19-21. 
297U.S. CaNST. amend. I. 
298 BELG. CONST. arts. 19, 21. Article 19 states, "[f]reedom of worship and its public exercise, 
as well as freedom to manifest personal opinions in every way, are guaranteed save for the 
repression of offenses committed in the exercise of these liberties. ld. art 19. Article 21 states in 
rei evant part: 
The State has no right to intervene either in the appointment or the induction of 
ministers of any form of worship, not to forbid them to correspond with their superiors 
and to publish their acts save, in the latter case, for the ordinary responsibility bound 
up with the press and publishing. 
/d. art. 21. 
299 See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text. 
300 XIANFA art. 36. 
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1990, regular church attendance is not a normal activity. 301 In fact, the 
report stated that holding religious beliefs alone was detrimental to 
students' physical and psychological health.302 If holding beliefs in God 
alone could cause alarm and be a potential violation of PRC law, then 
the guarantees of religious freedom are dubious.303 
In addition to limiting religious freedom to normal activities, the 
PRC demands that religious organizations submit to PRC rules.304 Ar-
ticle 36 of the PRC Constitution states that religious organizations shall 
be free from foreign domination.305 In practice, this requires religious 
organizations to cut themselves off from their foreign counterparts.306 
If any religious organization wants to survive in the PRC, it must submit 
to religious organizations that are local and government-approved.307 
Catholics in the PRC may openly practice their faith only in churches 
subject to the Patriotic Catholic Association, an organization which the 
PRC created and which forces priests and bishops to sever ties with the 
Vatican.308 In the Buddhist faith, the government has prohibited fur-
ther admissions of monks into the monasteries and further renovations 
of monasteries without government approval. 309 This additional evi-
dence further undermines the validity of the constitutional protections 
of religious freedom. 
The PRC's treatment of religious freedom under its constitution is 
relevant to its future treatment of academic freedom under the Basic 
Law. Although religious freedom carries explicit limitations while the 
right to education does not, it offers insight into the mind of the same 
government which proposes to guarantee academic freedom under 
the Basic Law.310 Thus, the absence of expressed limitations in the Basic 
Law for the right to education does not necessarily mean that the PRC 
301 Carver, supra note 148, at 362-63 (citing the S. China Morning Post on Sept. 4, 1990). 
302 !d. 
303 See id. 
304 See Carver, supra note 148, at 354-55. 
305 XIANFA art. 36. 
306 See Carver, supra note 148, at 354-55. 
307 See id. 
308 !d. at 354. Not only did this organization start to supervise priests' ordinations and church 
activities, it also forced priests and bishops to join the Association while severing ties with the 
Vatican. !d. Those who did not join faced arrest, imprisonment, and labor camps. !d. at 354-55. 
The exercise of religious freedom appeared to be only valid if one was willing to join the official, 
government-run churches. Carver, supra note 148, at 355. 
:l09 !d. 
310 See XIANFA tit.; Basic Law, supra note 10, tit. The National People's Congress of the PRC 
adopted both the PRC Constitution as well as the Basic Law. See XIANFA tit.; Basic Law, supra note 
10, tit. 
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will treat this individual freedom differently than it historically has 
treated other freedoms. 
2. Autonomy in the Eyes of the PRC 
As the preservation of academic freedom also depends on the level 
of autonomy granted to the Hong Kong SAR, the PRC's view of auton-
omy and independence must be examined. 311 If the PRC upholds its 
promises and allows the Hong Kong SAR to exercise the autonomy set 
forth in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, educators and stu-
dents may rest assured and continue to enjoy educational autonomy.312 
The PRC's recent treatment of Taiwan, however, stirs suspicions as to 
whether Hong Kong can truly maintain a high degree of autonomy 
under the PRC. 313 
Recent military tension arising in the Taiwan Strait between the PRC 
and Taiwanese governments has eroded the PRC's fac;:ade and given 
way to its views on autonomy and independence.314 Viewing President 
Lee's trip to the United States as a promotion of Taiwan's inde-
pendencem and Taiwan's first democratic presidential election as a 
cover-up for a Taiwanese independence movement, the PRC launched 
military exercises from the ground, the sea, and the air against Tai-
wan.316 Analysts argue that these military exercises stem from the PRC's 
sense of nationalism and sovereignty.317 The PRC's statement that it 
would do anything to safeguard its sovereignty serves as an affirmation 
of this. 318 
In light of this episode with Taiwan, Hong Kong's future autonomy 
is questionable. The PRC has always considered the island of Taiwan 
as its own.319 To the PRC, it is just a matter of time before it formally 
reunifies Taiwan to the mainland.320 Accordingly, in the eyes of the 
PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong have much in common.321 Both were 
m See Basic Law, supra note IO, art. I36. 
312 See id. art. 5. 
313 See supra notes 230-59 and accompanying text. 
314 See id. 
315 Taiwan Chronology, supra note 236; Tyler, China Hints at Timetable, supra note 232, at A2. 
316Tyler, China Says, supra note 248, at 5. 
317 Eckert, supra note 255. 
31H fd. 
m Shanghai Communique, supra note 232, at I 0-ll. 
320 Tyler, China Hints at Timetable, supra note 232, at A2. 
321 See id.; see also Eckert, supra note 255. 
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once part of China and are now destined to return to the PRC immi-
nently.322 Furthermore, the PRC has hinted that under reunification 
Taiwan would continue to experience the same level of autonomy 
offered to Hong Kong.323 Nonetheless, when one of these governments, 
Taiwan, acted in a manner suggesting a move towards independence, 
the PRC launched military campaigns designed to intimidate it.324 
Hong Kong rightly must question whether it will receive the same 
treatment should it exercise its autonomy granted by the Basic Law. 
3. Upholding the Basic Law on the Whole 
In addition to interpreting words in the Basic Law, it is of primary 
relevance to question whether the PRC will even uphold the Basic Law 
itself. If the Basic Law means nothing to the PRC government, then 
little security remains to the education system of Hong Kong after 
1997.325 The PRC's reactions towards Hong Kong Governor Chris Pat-
ten's democratic reforms are illustrative in this inquiry.326 
The Basic Law provides that the people of Hong Kong will eventually 
enjoy universal suffrage.327 Instead of lauding Governor Patten's pro-
posed democratic reforms in 1992 as measures in accordance with 
Article 68 of the Basic Law, the PRC denounced Patten and his reforms 
vehemently.328 Moreover, the PRC has been threatening to abolish the 
existing LegCo once the PRC regains sovereignty.329 
This episode alone gives rise to suspicions as to whether the PRC will 
take the Basic Law seriously. 330 The Basic Law clearly states that the 
people of Hong Kong will choose by universal suffrage not only the 
legislature, but also the ChiefExecutive.331 Destroying Patten's reforms, 
which move in the direction of universal suffrage, is contrary to the 
language of the Basic Law.332 Furthermore, as stated before, both the 
322 See Tyler, China Hints at Timetable, supra note 232, at A2. 
323 !d. 
324 Taiwan Chronology, supra note 236. 
325 See Gregory, supra note 208, at 190 n.108. 
326 See supra notes 211-29 and accompanying text. 
327 Basic Law, supra note 10, arts. 45, 68. 
328 Patten s Stormy Two Years, supra note 207. 
329 China Again Denounces, supra note 224; Elected Legislature, supra note 229, at A9; Schlesin-
ger, China Approves Measure, supra note 226. 
330 See Gregory, supra note 208, at 190. 
331 Basic Law, supra note 10, arts. 45, 68. 
332 See id. 
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Joint Declaration and the Basic Law guarantee that current social and 
economic systems will continue unaffected for the next fifty years. 333 
The PRC has contradicted itself by voting to abolish the legislature, 
not fifty years later, but on the very day that the PRC regains sover-
eignty.334 
B. The Education System Itself 
In addition to looking at the guarantees posed in the Basic Law, an 
examination of the education system itself shows that the future of 
educational autonomy and academic freedom is unclear. The highly 
centralized nature of the system makes it susceptible to political pres-
sures.335 Moreover, educational autonomy's close ties to and reliance 
on economic freedom make its survival questionable if the economy 
falters. 336 This following examination serves as further evidence that 
the PRC's promise for Hong Kong's educational autonomy is not solid. 
1. Highly Centralized Nature of the Education System 
An additional reason to question the guarantees in the Basic Law is 
the nature of the current education system. The system remains highly 
centralized.337 The three mechanisms that influence Hong Kong's cur-
riculum have already made changes suggestive of their cognizance of 
the PRC's imminent arrival.338 Despite traditionally having an apolitical 
education, a drive for political education is growing. 339 
Although four advisory committees exist, the current educational 
system is still highly centralized.340 The ultimate decision-making power 
rests in the governor-in-council alone.341 Although the Basic Law does 
not explicitly provide for the future of this post, there is evidence that 
such a highly centralized office will continue.342 The Queen of Eng-
333 Id., art. 5;Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(5), at 1372. 
334 Schlesinger, China Approves Measure, supra note 226. 
335 See Cheng, supra note 77, at 107. 
336 See MINERS, supra note 2, at 240; Lee, supra note 122, at 245. 
337 Cheng, supra note 77, at 107. 
338 See Morris, supra note 71, at 122, 129, 137. 
339 See id. at 129. 
340 Cheng, supra note 77, at 107. 
341 Jd. 
342 See Basic Law, supra note 10, art. 136. Article 136 sets forth that the education system under 
the SAR government will continue as "the previous educational system," i.e., the current Hong 
Kong system. Id. Implicitly, the governing structure will remain intact. See id.; see also Joint 
Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(5), at 1372. 
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land, of course, will no longer have influence over this post as before.343 
Instead, the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong SAR will likely be the 
one appointing an official to this post.344 Due to his capacity to appoint 
and to remove the person in this office, the Chief Executive will 
therefore have much authority and de facto influence over the deci-
sions of this official.345 The fact that students and educators may elect 
their Chief Executive pursuant to the Basic Law offers some assurance 
of educational autonomy.346 As seen with the PRC's reaction to Patten's 
democratic reforms, however, the future of popular elections in the 
Hong Kong SARis unclear.347 The only hope, then, would be to trust 
that the Chief Executive, or the official overseeing the educational 
system, will not capitulate to the political pressures of the PRC so as to 
compromise educational autonomy and academic freedom. Reliance 
on one person's willpower to resist political pressure is tenuous at best. 
Another point of concern is that the people of Hong Kong have 
been demanding a more political education.348 The government hopes 
that such an education would prepare people to become good citizens 
of the PRC.349 Local communities hope that a more politically literate 
and active citizenry will further democracy. 350 Both of these reasons 
would suggest that the PRC would want to become involved with the 
educational system as opposed to staying at bay. If the goal of a political 
education is to raise a citizenry for the PRC itself, it seems highly likely 
that the PRC would want to have its input as to what defines good 
citizenry. If the goal is for democracy, then the episode with Patten's 
democratic reforms suggests that the PRC may want to curb the pro-
motion of democracy. 
2. Education's Reliance on Economic Prosperity 
Beyond the language of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, the 
Hong Kong education system's relationship to the economy poses 
another potential Achilles' heel for the safeguards of educational 
autonomy.351 The PRC's favorable outlook on Hong Kong's current 
343 Cheng, supra note 77, at I07. 
344 See Basic Law, supra note IO, art. 48(7);Joint Declaration, supra note I, annex I,§ I, at I373. 
345 See Basic Law, supra note I 0, art. 48 (7). 
346 !d. art. 45. 
347 See supra notes 211-29 and accompanying text. 
348 Morris, supra note 71, at 129. 
349 !d. at 123. 
35o Jd. 
351 See supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text. 
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education system stems from its tight link to Hong Kong's economic 
prosperity.352 It is in the PRC's best interest to preserve internal struc-
tures, including the education system, in order that Hong Kong's 
economic growth may continue to benefit the PRC.353 An underlying 
premise of the guarantees of autonomy in the Basic Law is that Hong 
Kong will continue to prosper and benefit the PRC economically.354 
This begs the question of what will happen to the education system 
should the economy not continue to prosper. 
Despite past economic prosperity, the latest trends in the Hong Kong 
economy undermine thoughts of a continuous prosperity for Hong 
Kong. 355 Up to $3 billion (U.S.) in capital have been flowing out of 
Hong Kong annually. 356 Major businesses have relocated to other places 
outside of the PRC's jurisdiction.357 Plus, high level management has 
been emigrating out of Hong Kong along with other well-qualified and 
educated people at a mass rate. 358 If these numbers-mass outflow of 
capital and of people-continually increase, one wonders what would 
be left of the existing economy when july 1, 1997 arrives. 359 
C. Looking on the Bright Side 
On a more positive note, the current level of academic exchange 
between Hong Kong and the PRC may serve as an indication that the 
PRC will allow the Hong Kong education system to continue as it is. 360 
In addition to previously discussed economic benefits, Hong Kong's 
educational field serves as a valuable channel for intellectual ex-
change.361 Annually numerous scholars from the PRC visit Hong Kong 
and vice versa.362 Moreover, there have been several joint projects 
between institutions in Hong Kong and the PRC.363 There is potential 
352 See Leung, supra note 128, at 248. 
353 MINERS, supra note 2, at 240; Lee, supra note 122, at 248. 
354 See MINERS, supra note 2, at 240. Miners posits that China's main reason for leaving Hong 
Kong's economic systems intact is because of the economic benefits. !d. By interfering with the 
internal affairs of Hong Kong, China "would run the risk of killing the goose which has laid such 
golden eggs." !d. 
355 See supra notes 272-77 and accompanying text. 
356 MINERS, supra note 2, at 240 (citing an article by John Greenwood in the Asian Wall Street 
Journal on Mar. 14, 1990). 
357 !d. 
358 !d. at 240-41. 
359 !d. at 241. Already, Hong Kong's standards have seen a deterioration in efficiency. !d. 
360 See Leung, supra note 128, at 266-67. 
361 See id. at 267. 
362 !d. 
363 See id. 
1997] HoNG KoNG AFTER 1997 225 
for more exchange.364 This would leave one to think that the value of 
Hong Kong's education system to the PRC does not lie in economic 
! prosperity alone. Nonetheless, stacked against all the other reasons 
discussed above, one would have to wonder how much weight this last 
factor has in the preservation of educational autonomy and academic 
freedom in the future Hong Kong SAR. 
CONCLUSION 
As the date on which sovereignty over Hong Kong returns to the 
PRC approaches, discussion concerning people's individual freedoms 
and civil rights have arisen. One essential right is the right to education 
found in the Basic Law. In ensuring that students can enjoy such a 
right, the education system must maintain a certain level of autonomy 
so as to be free of government interference, in the form of censorship 
or infusion of socialist ideas, from the PRC. 
Although the words found in the Basic Law provide for educational 
autonomy and academic freedom and echo the words found in West-
ern constitutions, the surrounding context of these words give them a 
different interpretation. China's Confucian traditions and historic per-
spective show clearly that the PRC's concept of civil liberties and 
personal freedoms departs from the Western concept. This difference 
is manifested in the fact that the exercise of religious freedom in the 
PRC today is much more limited than its freedom in Western nations. 
In addition, if the PRC's recent treatment ofTaiwan is indicative of the 
PRC's reactions towards autonomy and its reactions to Patten's demo-
cratic reforms, Hong Kong's level of autonomy under the PRC appears 
to be limited. 
Aside from the dubious safeguards in the language of the official 
documents, the highly centralized nature of the education system 
serves as a possible downfall. Political pressures may be too strong for 
one person as the sole decision-maker to withstand. Some assurance 
rests in the fact that this person, in theory, will be democratically 
chosen. Nonetheless, given the PRC's negative reactions to the recent 
pushes towards democracy in Hong Kong and Taiwan, even the demo-
cratic election of the sole decision-maker is questionable. 
As a last caveat, one needs to realize that the education system's 
favorable stance in the eyes of the PRC is very much tied to Hong 
Kong's current economic prosperity. Against the backdrop of the fears 
of the people and current outflow of capital and human resources en 
364 !d. at 267--68. 
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masse, the future of the Hong Kong economy is very uncertain. If the 
economy falters, the PRC government may no longer favor the Hong 
Kong education system as it currently does to the level of allowing it 
to maintain a high degree of autonomy. 
In weighing all these factors, this Note concludes that the PRC's 
track record undermines its promises to Hong Kong. As such, it is 
dubious as to whether sufficient education autonomy does exist to 
safeguard academic freedom. The PRC's return to sovereignty over 
Hong Kong on july 1, 1997 will duly answer the questions raised in this 
Note. 
Vincent W Lau 
